LAOS
In October-November 1970, domestic and political pressure again compelled Nixon and Kissinger to accelerate the timetable for U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam. By the beginning of 1971, roughly 180,000 American troops remained in Vietnam (about one third of the peak U.S. strength.)(35) Moreover, it was anticipated that by the summer of 1972 only a small residual, logistical-type U.S. force of about 40,000 personnel would remain.(36) Thus, MACV thought that the dry season of 1970-71 (October-May) would be a good opportunity for the South Vietnamese to take the offensive. MACV could then objectively critique the impact of Vietnamization on ARVN up to that point. In effect this would be a “coming out party” for ARVN, and a chance to show the Communists they could initiate large operations without major U.S. involvement.(37) This was the basic rationale that led to a White House proposal to launch an invasion into Laos in February 1971.(38) The origins of a planned invasion of Laos illustrate how Henry Kissinger came to dominate not only the negotiations to end the war, but also showed how for all intents and purposes became the de facto chairman of the American Military Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nixon had basically abdicated his authority over the American military and the process of Vietnamization to Kissinger, at that time a “mere” special assistant to the president.(39) It was a very strange circumstance that found the respective commanders of the different branches of the U.S. military having to go through Kissinger before being able to discuss operations with President Nixon. Many senior level military personnel have since commented that it was a situation where Kissinger was essentially doing the job of secretary of defense and secretary of state at the same time.
Politically, the objective of the Laotian campaign would allow the final phase of Vietnamization to move forward on Kissinger's schedule. Militarily, the operation was to seize the Communist logistic complex in the Tchepone area. This region was a key strategic junction of supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. A successful campaign was considered necessary by MACV to help buy time for ARVN to reach its training and modernization goals. (40)
Operation LAMSON 719, the South Vietnamese designation given the operation, involved some of their best troops—the 1st ARVN Division, 1st Armored Brigade, and three ranger battalions from I Corps; and most of the elite Airborne Division and Marine Division from the JCS's strategic reserve. The overall commander of LAMSON 719 was Lt. General Hoang Xuan Lam, commanding general of I Corps, whose reputation as a combat commander was deemed “mediocre” by U.S. advisors.(41)
Senior American and Vietnamese leaders were therefore quite aware of the great risks involved in committing ARVN forces to a major offensive more or less completely on their own.(42) In December 1970 the U.S. Congress had imposed a legal prohibition on the expenditure of funds for any American ground forces operating outside South Vietnam. This would mean that the ground operations in Laos would have to be conducted solely by South Vietnamese troops without American advisors. Thus, U.S. forces were allowed to support LAMSON 719 with only limited tactical air support and long range artillery operating from South Vietnamese bases.(43) The prohibition of American advisors, partly as a result of the final phases of Vietnamization, was a new and potentially critical obstacle to closely coordinated operations. ARVN commanders were accustomed to counting on their American counterparts in arranging for U.S. air, heavy artillery, and logistical support.
Nixon was counting on the ARVN invasion of Laos to achieve two political objectives, as well as its military goals: To show the Communists that ARVN had become a viable fighting force, and pressure Communist officials in Paris to respond more favorably to Kissinger's peace initiatives.
Although LAMSON 719 began on schedule on 8 February 1971, just about everything went wrong from the beginning. Bad weather limited tactical air support the first day, and heavy rains on 9 February turned Route 9 into a quagmire.(44) Five days into the invasion and meeting only light resistance, an operation slated to last three months, stalled. Kissinger later claimed that on 12 February South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, feared that some of his best units were at risk, ordered his commanders to proceed cautiously and to cancel the operation once 3,000 casualties had been incurred.(45) Though ARVN units were allowed to resume the operation, the “taint” of the casualty directive by Thieu, and the fact that ARVN was meeting much stiffer resistance than anticipated caused the government in Saigon to re-assess the operations objectives.(46) Now instead of keeping an ARVN presence in Laos for ninety days, Thieu merely wanted to capture Tchepone, apparently for political and morale reasons.(47)
General Abrams, by now extremely frustrated with Thieu's actions and an apparent dearth of ARVN initiative, summed up the situation in a message sent to General Lam, Abrams stated, “you go in there just long enough to take a piss and then leave quickly.”(48) Finally, on 7 March the South Vietnamese occupied the deserted village of Tchepone, and on 8 March they abandoned it. Leaving behind many of their 1,830 casualties to an uncertain fate in the hands of the North Vietnamese.(49) On 7 April 1971, Nixon proclaimed in a televised speech to the American people that the South Vietnamese had demonstrated in Laos that, “without American advisors they (ARVN) could fight effectively against the very best troops North Vietnam could put in the field. Consequently, I can report tonight that Vietnamization has succeeded.”(50) Privately, however, Nixon and Kissinger thought LAMSON 719 “was clearly not a success,” and had exposed lingering deficiencies in Vietnamization.(51) The other major problems caused by the debacle of LAMSON 719, was that the North Vietnamese viewed the operation as “a big defeat” for Vietnamization, which encouraged the communists to persist and endure, realizing that American de-escalation would very shortly be completed.(52) The operation also exposed a gigantic logistical problem that the South Vietnamese were never able to rectify; that being without American logistic experts in country, ARVN was extremely hard pressed to move the supplies needed for large operations. This would come to haunt ARVN the following April when the Communists initiated their largest attacks of the entire war.(53)
FOOTNOTES
(35). The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. 105.
(36). Ibid., 105.
(37). Ibid., 217.
(38). White House Years. 984-985.
(39). Ibid., 985-987.
(40). The 25-year War: America's Role in Vietnam. 109.
(41). Ibid., 109. South Vietnman was broken up into four military Corps or areas. I Corps (referred to as “eye-corps”) was the northern most sector of South Vietnam which bordered the demilitarized zone (DMZ.) The Corps geography contained many of the countries most strategically important cities and military regions, i.e., Hue, Dong Ha, Khe Sanh, and Quang Tri.
(42). Tolson, John J. Air Mobility, 1961-1971: The Vietnamese Studies Series (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973), 144.
(43). Ibid., 147.
(44). The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. 111. Route 9 branched off to the east from Highway 1 (the main north to south highway in South Vietnam,) at Dong Ha. From there Route 9 traveled through Camp Carrol, Khe Sanh, and across the border into Laos ending at the Laotion village of Tchepone. Thus, becoming the main logistical artery for re-supply for ARVN troops entering Laos.
(45). White House Years. 1004. President Thieu in subsequent interviews has always denied setting a casualty limit for the operation.
(46). Nixon's Vietnam War. 245.
(47). Ibid., 245.
(48). Ibid., 2476.
(49). Haldeman, Harry Robbins. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: Putnam, 1994), 486.
(50). Ibid., 488.
(51). Ibid., 489.
(52). Nixon's Vietnam War. 248.
(53). On strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. 279.
The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969-1972 written by John Rincon.
No comments:
Post a Comment